We Are Nature, Bruxelles Nature et al. v Brussels-Capital Region

Brussels First Instance Tribunal, We Are Nature, Bruxelles Nature et al. v Brussels-Capital Region, Nr. 24/885/A, 29 October 2025

Two environmental NGOs, together with 1.330 Brussels citizens, initiated proceedings against the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) for failing to implement an adequate climate adaptation policy that protect its inhabitants from the effects of climate change, thereby breaching the general duty of care (Art. 6.5 of the Belgian Civil Code). The case primarily revolved around the region’s planning instruments, most notably the regional land-use plan, and their role in avoiding soil sealing, which is essential for climate adaptation. An additional concern was the lack of accurate estimates about the capacity of natural carbon sinks. Several international and European norms were used to specify the general duty of care against which these instruments were tested.

The applicants referred i.a. to the Kyoto protocol, the Paris Agreement as well as various decisions by the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The BCR contended that the obligations and objectives stemming from these instruments were not sufficiently precise to be used in this case. The Tribunal disagreed. First, it listed the different obligations – such as adopting adaptation measures – arising from these instruments, and which are binding on the Belgian State. Although these instruments may not directly impose obligations on the BCR, they nevertheless reflect a broad political consensus. As such, they are adequate to determine the minimal due diligence requirements in the face of a severe threat to the environment, goods and safety of the Brussels citizens. Consequently, notwithstanding its large measure of discretion, any public authority that fails to take reasonable account of the requirements from international – and European – law cannot be considered as a normally prudent and diligent public authority. The Tribunal therefore concluded that it could consider these norms when assessing the actions (or lack thereof) of the BCR. It ultimately sided with the applicants and ruled that the BCR violated the duty of care by failing to take sufficient measures to maintain and reinforce the absorption capacity of its natural carbon sinks. The Tribunal ordered that the BCR must take all necessary measures to temporarily suspend any construction on currently undeveloped sites larger than 0,5 ha until the revision of the regional land-use plan has been completed, or latest until 31 December 2026. The Brussels government appealed decision.


A. v Belgium

Supreme Court, A. v Belgium, Nr. P.25.1072.N, 29 July 2025

A former diplomat challenged the lawfulness of a house search on 17 June 2025 and her subsequent detention. She argued that while her diplomatic functions had ended on 27 November 2024, she continued to enjoy diplomatic immunity under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) as her Belgian residence permit remained valid and no explicit notification had been given regarding the expiry of the “reasonable period” to leave Belgium, as referred to in Article 39 (2) VCDR. She further contended that the search was invalid because her residence formed part of the inviolable premises of the mission under Article 22 VCDR.

The Court of Cassation found the latter plea to be inadmissible as it concerned a factual assessment for which it was not competent.

As to the former plea, the Court of Cassation held that the determination of the “reasonable period” under Article 39(2) falls within the autonomous assessment of the receiving State’s judiciary and does not require formal notification to the diplomat, nor a prior decision by the sending State. The existence of a residence permit does not bind the judge when assessing the expiry of immunity. Once the reasonable period has lapsed, immunity – including inviolability and protection from arrest – ceases to apply. As a result, the Court confirmed that the claimant no longer benefited from diplomatic immunity at the time of the search and rejected the appeal.


G. v Belgium

Board for Maritime Investigation, G. v Belgium, Nr. 3109, 3 June 2025

Following severe budget cuts, the Belgian Ministry of Defence could only provide the Belgian State-owned oceanographic vessel RV Belgica with three military crew members. To operate the vessel – which sails under a Belgian flag and under Navy operational command – a public tender was awarded to a French operator (G), which assumed responsibility for management and crewing. Following complaints about labour conditions, Belgian authorities identified serious breaches of the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), revoked the vessel’s MLC certificate and eventually prohibited the vessel from sailing on 27 June 2024.

G. challenged this decision, arguing that the Belgica fell outside the MLC’s scope as a naval auxiliary and therefore benefited from the exemption in MLC art. II(4). Observing that the vessel could not meet the definition of a warship under art. 29 UNCLOS (given the composition of its crew), the Board rejected this argument and held that, under MLC art. II (5) and art. 4 §3 of the Belgian Law of 13 June 2014, in cases of doubt regarding a vessel’s inclusion, the determination rests with the flag State’s competent authority after consultation with shipowner and seafarer representatives. In casu, the Belgian Directorate-General for Shipping (the competent authority), after consultation with Commission paritaire 316, had validly determined that the vessel fell within the MLC regime, given its predominantly civilian crew and minimal military complement. G., designated as the “shipowner,” was therefore bound by its obligations under the 2006 MLC. The sailing ban was upheld and the appeal dismissed.