Matilde Meertens – ILBC DATABASE

Brussels First Instance Tribunal, We Are Nature, Bruxelles Nature et al. v Brussels-Capital Region, Nr. 24/885/A, 29 October 2025

Two environmental NGOs, together with 1.330 Brussels citizens, initiated proceedings against the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) for failing to implement an adequate climate adaptation policy that protect its inhabitants from the effects of climate change, thereby breaching the general duty of care (Art. 6.5 of the Belgian Civil Code). The case primarily revolved around the region’s planning instruments, most notably the regional land-use plan, and their role in avoiding soil sealing, which is essential for climate adaptation. An additional concern was the lack of accurate estimates about the capacity of natural carbon sinks. Several international and European norms were used to specify the general duty of care against which these instruments were tested.

The applicants referred i.a. to the Kyoto protocol, the Paris Agreement as well as various decisions by the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The BCR contended that the obligations and objectives stemming from these instruments were not sufficiently precise to be used in this case. The Tribunal disagreed. First, it listed the different obligations – such as adopting adaptation measures – arising from these instruments, and which are binding on the Belgian State. Although these instruments may not directly impose obligations on the BCR, they nevertheless reflect a broad political consensus. As such, they are adequate to determine the minimal due diligence requirements in the face of a severe threat to the environment, goods and safety of the Brussels citizens. Consequently, notwithstanding its large measure of discretion, any public authority that fails to take reasonable account of the requirements from international – and European – law cannot be considered as a normally prudent and diligent public authority. The Tribunal therefore concluded that it could consider these norms when assessing the actions (or lack thereof) of the BCR. It ultimately sided with the applicants and ruled that the BCR violated the duty of care by failing to take sufficient measures to maintain and reinforce the absorption capacity of its natural carbon sinks. The Tribunal ordered that the BCR must take all necessary measures to temporarily suspend any construction on currently undeveloped sites larger than 0,5 ha until the revision of the regional land-use plan has been completed, or latest until 31 December 2026. The Brussels government appealed decision.

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Supreme Court, C.C. v A.P., Nr. C.21.0470.F, 26 January 2024

Does Article 3.1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Children (‘CRC’) have direct effect? This issue was at the heart of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 January 2024. In a short judgment, the Court answered that question in the negative and quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal of Liège.

The case concerned two (divorced) parents who were in dispute over their child’s housing and education. In support of his application, A.P. (the defendant party), had produced certain documents taken from the child’s youth case file. Although this contravened Article 27, §5 of the Code on Prevention, Youth Support and Youth Protection, the Court of Appeal had nevertheless admitted these documents to the procedure, as it considered that ‘[a] child’s life forms a whole, even if, from a legal or psychosocial level, different authorities are each responsible to deal with a part of its existence’. It based its reasoning on Art. 3.1 CRC, which stipulates that all decisions concerning children must be taken in their best interests. As it considered it in the best interests to have of as much information as possible, the Court of Appeal gave precedence to Article 3.1 over the aforementioned provision of domestic law.

In its judgment, the Supreme Court recalls that, for an international norm to have direct effect, two conditions must be fulfilled: the norm must be (i) sufficiently precise and (ii) complete. Article 3.1 CRC, however, does not fulfil these conditions, as it leaves the State with several options for meeting the requirements of the child’s best interests. The Court did not provide any further explanation, but has spoken out on this matter in other judgments (Cass., 2 March 2012, C.10.0685.F, Pas., 2012, n° 145 ; Cass., 4 November 1999, C.99.0048.N, Pas., 1999, n° 588, et Cass., 4 November 1999, C.99.0111.N.). In the end, the Court concluded that Article 3.1 CRC cannot serve as a source of subjective rights or obligations for individuals, and cannot override domestic law.

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