Category: First Instance Tribunal

We Are Nature, Bruxelles Nature et al. v Brussels-Capital Region

On By In First Instance Tribunal
Brussels First Instance Tribunal, We Are Nature, Bruxelles Nature et al. v Brussels-Capital Region, Nr. 24/885/A, 29 October 2025

Two environmental NGOs, together with 1.330 Brussels citizens, initiated proceedings against the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) for failing to implement an adequate climate adaptation policy that protect its inhabitants from the effects of climate change, thereby breaching the general duty of care (Art. 6.5 of the Belgian Civil Code). The case primarily revolved around the region’s planning instruments, most notably the regional land-use plan, and their role in avoiding soil sealing, which is essential for climate adaptation. An additional concern was the lack of accurate estimates about the capacity of natural carbon sinks. Several international and European norms were used to specify the general duty of care against which these instruments were tested.

The applicants referred i.a. to the Kyoto protocol, the Paris Agreement as well as various decisions by the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The BCR contended that the obligations and objectives stemming from these instruments were not sufficiently precise to be used in this case. The Tribunal disagreed. First, it listed the different obligations – such as adopting adaptation measures – arising from these instruments, and which are binding on the Belgian State. Although these instruments may not directly impose obligations on the BCR, they nevertheless reflect a broad political consensus. As such, they are adequate to determine the minimal due diligence requirements in the face of a severe threat to the environment, goods and safety of the Brussels citizens. Consequently, notwithstanding its large measure of discretion, any public authority that fails to take reasonable account of the requirements from international – and European – law cannot be considered as a normally prudent and diligent public authority. The Tribunal therefore concluded that it could consider these norms when assessing the actions (or lack thereof) of the BCR. It ultimately sided with the applicants and ruled that the BCR violated the duty of care by failing to take sufficient measures to maintain and reinforce the absorption capacity of its natural carbon sinks. The Tribunal ordered that the BCR must take all necessary measures to temporarily suspend any construction on currently undeveloped sites larger than 0,5 ha until the revision of the regional land-use plan has been completed, or latest until 31 December 2026. The Brussels government appealed decision.

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X v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

On By In First Instance Tribunal
Ghent First Instance Tribunal, X v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Nr. 18/3932/A, 17 October 2022

A Belgian businesswoman sought compensation from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, claiming in particular that an official press release, in which she had been presented as  being unreliable, had caused her financial and moral damage. The Court held, however, that the passing on of information on the applicant by the Saudi Embassy in Belgium to the Saudi Ministry of Trade and Industry constituted an act ‘jure imperii’, benefiting from State immunity. By reference to Article 12 of the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity and the preparatory works of the International Law Commission, the Court further held that the ‘territorial tort’ exception does not apply to reputational damage and was accordingly inapplicable. In turn, the publication of a press release on the applicant within Saudi Arabia did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts.

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L., M. et al. v Kingdom of Belgium

On By In First Instance Tribunal
Brussels First Instance Tribunal, L., M. et al. v Kingdom of Belgium, Nr. 20/4655/A, 8 December 2021

This case revolves around a claim issued by 5 people with Congolese roots against the Belgian state in connection with Belgium’s colonial past in Belgian Congo, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All claimants had been committed into a religious institute and hence separated from their family as children between 1948 and 1961. At the time, placing Métis (mixed-race parentage) children  in religious institutes was routine practice. The claimants’ position that this segregation epitomized a crime against humanity, based on which they were entitled to compensation, was, however, held to be unfounded. Having regard to the principle of legality, the Tribunal rather found that the placement of people in such religious institutions for racial reasons did not amount to a crime against humanity at the time. Acknowledging that the concept of crimes against humanity had gradually broadened over time, however, the court added that if these actions were to occur today, they would likely be seen as such.

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Labour Prosecutor et al. v X and X

On By In First Instance Tribunal
Brussels First Instance Tribunal, Labour Prosecutor et al. v X et al., Nr. 21.N.003187, 15 December 2021

A former diplomat and his wife are condemned in absentia for the crimes of human trafficking and unlawful imprisonment on account of their exploitation of a domestic worker. The Tribunal asserts that, pursuant to Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomat whose function has come to an end enjoys immunity only in respect of those acts that were performed in the exercise of this function. The exploitation of domestic workers in the diplomat’s private residence does not qualify as such, and is accordingly not covered by diplomatic immunity.

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X {Ex parte}

On By In First Instance Tribunal
Liège First Instance Tribunal, X, Nr. 20/770/B, 5 February 2021

The Tribunal assessed wether a man of Palestinian origin, as well as his underage children, could be recognized as stateless persons. According to the Tribunal, the inconsistent Belgian case-law on the question whether Palestine qualified as a State rendered it necessary to refer to the position of the organ constitutionally competent in the matter, i.e., the Belgian federal government. In light of the government’s refusal to recognize Palestine as a State, any attempt at indirect recognition of Palestinian statehood by the judiciary was in vain. The Tribunal accordingly confirmed the applicants should be regarded as being stateless in the sense of the 1954 New York Convention.

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