A.C. v NATO and Belgium

Supreme Court, A. C. v NATO and Belgium, Nr. C.20.0313.F/1, 7 November 2024

In a judgment of 23 November 2017, the Brussels Court of Appeals upheld NATO’s immunity from jurisdiction in tort proceedings brought by relatives of individuals killed during a NATO strike in Libya in 2011. A subsequent appeal in cassation against the judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court confirms that the immunity from jurisdiction of international organizations serves a legitimate purpose. Whether its application constitutes a proportionate restriction of the right to access to court in the sense of Article 6(1) ECHR must be determined, not on the basis of the nature of the substantive right that is allegedly breached, but in light of the existence of other reasonable means to protect the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. Such reasonable means can notably consist of remedies available in a country that does not grant immunity of jurisdiction to an international organization. What is more, as indicated by the Court of Appeals, an alternative remedy could exist in a judicial procedure brought against the NATO Member State that carried out the contested airstrikes. The fact that the latter State had not been identified, and that the Court of Appeal had not established a concrete possibility for the claimant to identify this State, was not deemed not alter the foregoing.

Multiple sub-branches addressed different procedural and legal grounds were all found inadmissible or without merit. Thus, the Supreme Court i.a. held that, for lack of direct effect in Belgium, the UN Security Council resolutions invoked by the claimant did not constitute a law the violation of which could underpin an appeal in cassation, and that relevant passages from UNSC resolutions did not constitute binding decisions in the sense of Article 25 UN Charter. In the end, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that NATO’s immunity stands and cannot be bypassed.


Touax v Touax Rom

Supreme Court, Touax v Touax Rom, Nr. C.13.0528.F, 9 February 2017

During the 1999 Kosovo war, two shipping companies operating boats on the Danube saw their commercial activities come to a halt because of the bombing of several bridges over the river by NATO. They turned to the Kingdom of Belgium to receive compensation for their economic losses, relying on article 1382 of the civil code. According to the claimants, Belgium’s participation in NATO’s military operation constituted a breach of the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter and accordingly qualified as a tort.

In 2013, the Brussels Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, holding that a private person cannot invoke a violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter because the provision lacks direct effect.

The judgment was later upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the claimants did not invoke any fact – other than the alleged breach of Article 2(4) UN Charter – of such nature as to constitute an error of conduct. It also dismissed the argument that the existence of a tort deduced from a provision of an international treaty does not require that this provision has direct effect in the internal legal order. Lastly, the Supreme Court did away with the alleged violation of the jus in bello resulting from Belgium’s participation in the bombing of non-military targets: as the bridges over the Danube constituted a military objective, their destruction could not constitute a tort.