H.S.

Supreme Court, H.S., Nr. P.22.0053.N, 14 June 2022

The Belgian Supreme Court rejects the claim that the judgment of the Antwerp Court of Appeal of 22 December 2021 violated the duty to state reasons by holding, on the one hand, that Islamic State (IS) qualified as a ‘terrorist group’ in the sense of Articles 139 and 140 of the Criminal Code, pertaining to the prosecution of terrorist offences, but did not constitute ‘armed forces’ in the sense of Article 141bis of the same Code (which excludes members of armed forces involved in an armed conflict from prosecution for terrorist offences). The Supreme Court held that the notion of ‘armed forces’ in the sense of Article 141bis must be understood in light of the requirements of intensity and organization under international humanitarian law (IHL), and is distinct from the notion of ‘terrorist group’. The Supreme Court recalls the various reasons that led the Antwerp Court of Appeal to conclude that IS lacked the required degree of organization to be considered an ‘armed force’, including e.g. the lack of a single headquarters or command structure; the large number of foreign fighters operating without a clear overarching command, or; the practice of random detentions in lieu of disciplinary rules as envisaged under IHL. The Supreme Court concludes that the contested judgment was duly motivated.


M.E.Y. v O.R.V. / F.B. v Politiezone nr. 5340 Brussel-West, D.B. et al

Belgian Supreme Court, M.E.Y. v O.R.V.; F.B. v Politiezone nr. 5340 Brussel-West, D.B. et al, Nr. P.16.0244.N, 24 May 2016
ECLI:BE:CASS:2016:ARR.20160524.5

The case concerns an action for annulment brought against a judgment of the Antwerp Court of Appeals finding the applicants guilty of terrorist offences under the Belgian Criminal Code in connection with their involvement in islamist terrorist groups abroad. In particular, the applicants unsuccesfully raise breaches of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 141bis of the Belgian Criminal Code, Article 7 ECHR and the principle of legality. All claims are, however, dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to Article 141bis of the Criminal Code, the provisions pertaining to terrorist offences do not apply to the conduct of armed forces during an armed conflict. Such ‘armed conflict’ exists whenever when there is armed violence between States or protracted armed violence between State authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. The existence of a non-international armed conflict is determined primarily in light of the intensity of the conflict and the degree of organization of the parties involved. Other criteria cited by international jurisprudence are merely indicative criteria that can be used to interpret the requirements of intensity and organization. The appraisal of these criteria in a given case is a matter for the judge of the merits, and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court (as long as proper statement of reasons is provided).