I. à X. E. N. v Prosecutor

Supreme Court, I. à X. E. N. v Prosecutor, Nr. P.24.1012.F/1, 18 December 2024

The judgment concerns (among others) an appeal in cassation by a person who was found guilty by the Court of Assizes of the Judicial District of Brussels of genocide and war crimes committed in Rwanda between 9 April and 28 May 1994. The applicant claimed that the conviction for genocide violated the principle of legality in criminal law (inter alia Article 7 ECHR), since Belgian criminal law did not formally criminalize genocide at the time the acts were committed (but did so only as of 1999).

The Supreme Court dismissed the claim since the conviction was based on international law already in force at the time of the acts, namely the 1948 Genocide Convention, ratified by Belgium in 1951. The Court held that this convention defines the offence with sufficient clarity and confirms the existence of an international custom that is binding on States, including within their domestic legal order. Accordingly, the crime of genocide already formed part of the Belgian legal order before the entry into force of the dedicated legislation adopted in 1999. Furthermore, the Court held that whereas the Genocide Convention does not explicitly prescribe penalties, the national judge could determine the sentence under domestic criminal provisions, such as those relating to murder, since the killing of members of the targeted group constitutes one of the constitutive elements of genocide.


L., M. et al. v Kingdom of Belgium

Brussels Court of Appeal, L., M. et al. v Kingdom of Belgium, Nr. 2022/AR/262, 2 December 2024

This judgment overturns an earlier ruling of the Brussels First Instance Tribunal of 8 December 2021 (see here), in which the Tribunal rejected the claims for compensation against the Belgian State, lodged by five individuals of Congolese descent who had been forcibly removed from their mothers as children and placed in religious institutes on account of their mixed-race parentage between 1948 and 1961. The Court of Appeal overturned the judgement of the First Instance Tribunal on two fundamental grounds.

Firstly, with regard to the principle of legality, the Tribunal at first instance had held that, at the time the acts were committed, they did not yet qualify as crimes against humanity. The Court of Appeal rejected this reasoning. Relying on the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and UNGA resolution 95(I) of 1946, the Court held that the crime of humanity was recognized as an offence by the international community as of 1946. Further, notwithstanding the specific competence of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it was not confined to acts committed in situations of armed conflict. The fact that practices of racial segregation were not limited to Belgium at the time, and may have been institutionalized, moreover did not alter the fact that the abduction of young children solely for racial reasons qualified as a crime against humanity.

Secondly, concerning the issue of prescription, the First Instance Tribunal had found that the case was time-barred. This conclusion was also overturned on appeal. Since the acts were now qualified as crimes against humanity (offences that are not subject to statutory limitation) the Court of Appeal indeed held that prescription could not serve as a ground to bar the proceedings.

In the end, the Belgian government was ordered to pay EUR 50.000 compensation to each of the five “enfants métis” (increased with compensatory interest).


Prosecutor v former Guatemalan State officials

Leuven Assize Court, Prosecutor v former Guatemalan State officials, Nr. FD30.98.000213-03, 14 December 2023

On 14 December 2023, the Assize Court of Flemish Brabant convicted in absentia five former high-ranking military and political leaders from Guatemala and sentenced them to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity committed against four Flemish missionaries.

The Court established that the killings formed part of a “widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population,” within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, to which Article 136ter of the Belgian Criminal Code refers. It situated these acts within the broader context of the Guatemalan civil war (1960–1996), noting that the facts at issue were committed between 1980 and 1982. During this protracted conflict, large numbers of civilians were subjected to grave human rights violations, including abductions, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. Against this background, the Court concluded that the murders were not isolated acts but part of a larger pattern of violence, thereby qualifying them as crimes against humanity. This classification was also significant from a procedural standpoint, as such international crimes are not subject to statutes of limitation and are therefore imprescriptible.

With regard to the mode of liability, the Court relied, inter alia, on the doctrine of “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (JCE), reportedly for the first time in Belgian legal practice. Under this mode of liability, all participants in a collective criminal plan (regardless of their rank or level of direct involvement) can be held equally responsible for crimes committed in furtherance of the common purpose. By applying this doctrine, the Court attributed responsibility to the accused not only for their own actions but also for the acts carried out by others within the framework of the shared criminal enterprise.

All five accused were sentenced to life imprisonment, reflecting both the gravity of the crimes and their central role in the underlying criminal conduct.


Prosecutor v N.F.

Brussels Assize Court, Prosecutor v. N.F., Nr. FD30-98.102/02, 19 December 2019

Culpability

In this criminal judgment, a jury considered the question of guilt of the accused, N.F, for acts committed during the Rwandan genocide. Based on several witness statements, the jury concluded that the accused was guilty of the crime of genocide and fifteen counts of war crimes. Specifically, it was found that the accused provided assistance in the deliberate killing of members of the Tutsi ethnic group, such that without his assistance these crimes could not have been committed. The members killed were protected by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, consequently, their killing constituted a war crime. These war crimes were moreover part of the genocide of the Tutsis, and the jury found that the evidence presented proved that the accused held a genocidal intent. Conversely, the jury did not find the accused guilty of two counts of war cirmes with which he was charged for lack of information.

Penalty

The judgment determines the criminal penalty of N.F., who was previously found guilty of genocide and fifteen counts of war crimes. The judgement states that N.F. benefits from mitigating circumstances because of his age. Ultimately, N.F. is sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The penalty is decided on the basis of the gravity of the crimes committed, which are so serious that they have harmed the whole of humanity and threatened the peace, security and well-being of the world. Moreover, N.F. showed himself to be a leader with a will to exterminate the Tutsi population and incited others to do so as well. Finally, N.F. did not show any indications of having questioned his actions. On the contrary, during the trial, he continued to convey his genocidal ideology. This revealed him to pose a current and specific danger to society.